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Abstract ˗ Delivery lead-time has become a factor of competitiveness for companies and an 
important criterion of purchase for the customers today. Thus, in order to increase their profit, 
companies must not focus only on price but also need to quote the right delivery lead time to their 
customers. Some authors to find a way in quoting the right delivery lead-time while considering an 
M/M/1 system. In M/M/1, all customers are accepted. This can lead to longer lead times in the queue. 
Firms can react by quoting longer lead times in order to cope with this situation. However, this leads 
to lower demand and revenue. Starting from this observation, we investigate in this paper whether a 
customer rejection policy can be more beneficial for the firm than an all-customers’ acceptance 
policy. Indeed, our idea is based on the fact that rejecting some customers might help to quote shorter 
lead time for the accepted customers, which might lead to higher demand and profit. We model this 
rejection policy based on an M/M/1/K system. We analytically determine the optimal firm’s policy 
(optimal price and quoted lead time) in case of M/M/1/1 system. Then, we compare the optimal firm’s 
profit under M/M/1/1 with the optimal profit obtained by M/M/1. Two situations are considered: a 
system without holding and penalty costs and a system where these costs are included. 
 
Keywords: Lead-time quotation, Pricing, M/M/1/K, M/M/1. 
 
1. Introduction 
The delivery lead-time, which represents the elapsed time between the placement of the order by 
the customer and the receipt of this order, has become a factor of competitiveness for companies and 
an important purchase criterion for many customers. Geary and Zonnenberg (2000) reported that top 
performers among 110 organizations conducted initiatives not only to reduce costs and maintain 
reliability, but also to improve delivery speed and flexibility. Baker et al. (2001) found that less than 
10% of end consumers and less than 30% of corporate customers base their purchasing decisions on 
price only; for a substantial majority of purchasers both price and delivery lead time are crucial 
factors that determine their purchase decisions. Thus, in order to increase their profit, companies must 
not focus only on price but also need to quote the right delivery lead time to their customers. A short 
quoted lead time can lead to higher demand but can also result in late delivery, which affects the 
firm’s reputation for on-time delivery and deters future customers (Slotnick, 2014). In addition, 
companies risk to lose markets if they are not capable of respecting the quoted delivery lead-times 
(Kapuscinski and Tayur, 2007). A long quoted lead time can reduce the risk of late delivery but leads 
to lower demand. This raises the following relevant question: What is the best lead time that must be 
quoted by a company when customers are not only sensitive to price but also to lead time? Some 
authors tried to answer this question while considering an M/M/1 system (Palaka at al., 1998, So and 
Song, 1998, and Pekgün et al., 2008). As stated by Gross et al. (2008); Kleinrock (1975); 
Thomopoulos (2012), one of the characteristics of M/M/1 is the infinite system capacity. Thus, the 
M/M/1 accepts all customers, which can lead to longer lead times in the queue. In order to cope with 
this situation, firms can react by quoting longer lead times in order to maintain the desired service 
level. However, this leads to lower demand and revenue. Starting from this observation, we 
investigate in this paper whether a customer rejection policy can be more beneficial for the firm than 
an all-customers acceptance policy. Indeed, our idea is based on the fact that rejecting some customers 
might help to quote shorter lead time for the accepted customers, which might lead to higher demand 
and profit. We model this rejection policy based on an M/M/1/K system. We analytically determine 
the optimal firm’s policy (optimal price and quoted lead time) in case of M/M/1/1 system. Then, we 
compare the optimal firm’s profit under M/M/1/1 with the optimal profit obtained by M/M/1. Two 
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situations are considered: a system without holding and penalty costs and a system where these costs 
are included. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. A literature review on M/M/1 systems with 
leadtime-dependent demand is presented in the next section. Then, we develop in section 3 the 
formulation of the M/M/1/K system with price-and leadtime-sensitive demand. In Section 4, we 
analytically solve the M/M/1/K system for K=1 without holding and penalty cost and compare the 
results to those obtained with M/M/1. We dedicate section 5 to the case with holding and penalty cost. 
We finally conclude and give future work directions.  
 
2. Literature Review 
In the past decades, a considerable number of researchers in economics and operations 
management have studied: price-, rebate-, space-, quality, and advertising-dependent demand. Huang 
et al. (2013) suggested that there may exist further research opportunities for using lead time–
dependent demand as they had found only few publications belonging to lead time–dependent 
categories. 
A highlighted by Huang et al. (2013), the M/M/1 model is widely used in the literature to 
incorporate a price- and lead-time sensitive demand in a make-to-order system. In what follows, we 
review such models.  
Palaka et al. (1998) studied the lead-time setting, pricing decisions, and capacity utilization of a 
profit maximizing firm that faces a linear price- and leadtime-sensitive demand. Costs related to 
congestion (holding cost) and late deliveries (penalty cost) are considered in Palaka et al.’s model. So 
and Song (1998) developed an analytical framework for a firm to understand the strong 
interrelationships among pricing, delivery time guarantees, demand, and the overall profitability of 
offering the services. The authors used a log linear function to model the demand as a function of 
price, delivery time, and delivery reliability level. Pekgün et al. (2008) studied centralization and 
decentralization of pricing and lead-time decisions of a Make-To-Order (MTO) firm, while using the 
same setting of Palaka et al. (1998) for their decentralized model but without holding and penalty 
cost. 
There are some other research that used the M/M/1 to model their MTO system in order to model the 
lead-time- and price-dependent demand (Ho and Zheng, 2004; Liu et al., 2007; Ray and Jewkes, 
2004; Zhao et al., 2012). Ray and Jewkes(2004) conduct a research about costumer lead-time 
management with demand and price sensitive to lead-time. In their research, the price is sensitive to 
lead-time. Demand is modeled as linear function, so is the price sensitive lead-time. Ho and Zheng 
(2004), they model the demand in MNL model. They conduct research in single firm and competitive 
multi-firm. Ho and Zheng (2004) discuss about the competitive market that the demand sensitive to 
lead-time. They use game theory approach to show how a firms should react to the market and 
another firm’s lead-time strategy. The demand is modeled as costumer utility (satisfactory). Liu et al. 
(2007) conduct research about the decentralized supply chain in single firm. They mainly use 
Stackelberg game with supplier and retailer to quote the lead time and price. Zhao et al. (2012) 
discuss about the lead time and pricing decision for two types of costumer: lead-time sensitive or 
price sensitive. They use two policies which are uniform or differentiated model. Zhao et al. (2012) 
model the demand in the willingness-to-pay model for single firm problem. 
 
3. Proposed Model (The M/M/1/K) 
We consider a make-to-order firm operating under the following M/M/1/K setting. Customers are 
served in first-come, first-served basis (FCFS). The arrival process is assumed to be Poisson process. 
The processing time of customers in the system is assumed to be exponentially distributed. Contrary 
to the assumptions of M/M/1 model where all customers are accepted (as in Palaka et al., 1998 and 
Pekgun et al., 2008), we reject clients when there is already K clients in the system. The capacity is 
assumed to be constant while price, quoted lead-time and demand are decision variables.  
Similarly to Liu et al. (2007); Palaka et al. (1998); and Pekgün et al. (2008), the demand is 
assumed to be a linear decreasing function in price and quoted lead-time. 
  ,, 21 lbpbalp   (1) 
where: 
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p  =  price of the good/service set by the firm, 
l  =  quoted lead-time, 
 lp,  =  expected demand for the good/service with price p and quoted lead-time l, 
a  = market potential,  
1b  =  price sensitivity of demand, 
2b  =  lead-time sensitivity of demand, 
 
Since the demand is downward sloping in both price and quoted lead-time, b1 and b2 are restricted to 
be non-negative  
According to Palaka et al. (1998), this linear demand function is tractable and has several 
desirable properties. For instance, with such a linear demand, the price elasticity is increasing in both 
price and quoted lead-time. Customers would be more sensitive to long lead-times when they are 
paying more for the goods or service. Similarly, customers would be more sensitive to high prices 
when they also have longer waiting times.  
In order to prevent the firms from quoting unrealistically short lead-times, we assume that the 
firm maintains a certain minimum service level. The service level is defined as the probability of 
meeting the quoted lead-time (P (W ≤ l) ≥ s).  
Since we assume an M/M/l/K queueing system with mean service rate, μ, mean arrival rate (or, 
demand), λ, and throughput rate (effective demand),  ,the expected number of customers in the 
system is given by Ls (see eq. (2)), and the actual lead-time (time in the system) is exponentially 
distributed with mean sL (see eq. (3)). The probability that the firm is able to meet the quoted lead-
time l (P (W ≤ l)) and the probability that a job is late (P (W > l)) are given in eq. (4). Equations (2) 
and (3) are based on Gross et al. (2008) and equation (4) is based on Sztrik (2011). 
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The objective of the firm is to maximize its revenue, which includes the following three main parts: 
(1) Expected revenue (net of direct costs) is represented by  mp  , where m is the unit direct 
variable cost.  
(2) Total Congestion costs is expressed as the mean number of jobs in the system multiplied by 
the unit holding cost (Ls × F). This cost typically represents the in-process inventory holding 
cost.  
(3) Total Lateness penalty cost is expressed as (penalty per job per unit lateness) × (number of 
overdue clients) × (expected lateness given that a job is late). The number of overdue clients 
is equal to: (throughput rate) × (probability that a job is late). The penalty cost per job per unit 
lateness (denoted by c) reflects the direct compensation paid to customers for not meeting the 
quoted lead-time. Mathematically, this total Lateness penalty cost is given by 
  WlWPc  . 
 
Thus, the firm’s optimization problem can be modeled as follows: 
 
(P0) 
,,
Maximize
pl
       WlWPcFLmp s    (5) 
 Subject to  lbpba 21   (6) 
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where, 
Decision Variables Parameters 
p
 = price of the good/service set by the firm, a  = market potential, 
l  = quoted lead-time, 1b  
= price sensitivity of demand, 
  = mean arrival rate (demand), 2b  
= lead-time sensitivity of demand, 
     = mean service rate (production 
capacity), 
   m  = unit direct variable cost, 
   s  = service level defined by company, 
   F  = unit holding cost 
   c  = penalty cost per job per unit lateness 
   
KP  
= probability of rejected customer, 
   K  = system capacity. 
 
In this formulation, constraint (6) imposes that the mean demand (λ) cannot be greater than the 
demand obtained with price (p) and quoted lead-time (l). Constraint (7) expresses the service level 
constraint. Constraint (9) calculates the probability of rejecting customer. Constraint (10) gives the 
number of customers that are served and exit the system. Constraint (11) is the non-negativity 
constraint. 
Solving the general problem analytically seems difficult. Hence, we focus in this paper on the 
particular case of K=1. In section 4, we start by studying the system without penalty and holding 
costs. Then, in section 5, we investigate whether the (M/M/1/1) model can give a higher profit than 
the widely considered M/M/1 model. In section 6, we solve the (M/M/1/1) model while considering 
the penalty and holding costs. We dedicate section 7 to the comparison between this model and the 
(M/M/1).   
 
4. M/M/1/1 without Penalty and Holding Costs 
In this section, we solve the system with K = 1 and without holding and penalty costs. In this 
case, the objective function  consists only in maximizing the expected revenue. With K=1, the 
Probability  lWP   becomes equal to le  . Hence, the service level constraint can be written as 1  
le     s . The formulation of the problem becomes: 
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  11 P   (17) 
 0,,,  lp  (18) 
Eq. (14) can be rewritten as   sl  11ln . Then, by integrating the equality constraints (eq. (15-
18)) into the objective function, we can simplify the formulation as: 
(P1’)
pl ,,
Maximize

  mp 

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 Subject to  lbpba 21   (20) 
   sl  11ln  (21) 
 0,, lp  (22) 
Using the new formulation (P1’), we firstly transform the problem into a single variable optimization 
model.  
Suppose that the optimal solution is given by price, p*, quoted lead-time l*, and demand rate λ*, 
and that λ* < Λ(p*,1*.). Since the revenues are increasing in p, one could increase the price to p' (while 
holding the demand rate and quoted lead-time constant) until λ* = Λ(p',1'). This change will increase 
revenues without increasing costs. Therefore, (p*, l*, and λ*) cannot be an optimal solution. Hence, the 
demand constraint eq. (20) is binding at optimality in our new problem. Thus:  
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To analyze the service level constraint, we applying the Lagrangian multiplier method: 
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We see that a stationary point to problem (P1’) must satisfy: 
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Given that     12 bb  thus, 0 . Thus,    011ln  sl  which means service level 
constraint (eq. (21)) is binding at optimality in our new problem. Hence,    sl  11ln . We 
denote   s11ln  by z, and get: 
zl   with   sz  11ln  (27) 
Substitute l  by z  into the equations of p at optimality conditions, we obtain  
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However, we also have three conditions which are: 
1. Demand is positive (λ ≥ 0) 
2. Price is positive (p ≥ 0) 
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3. Profit is positive where we must satisfy condition: p ≥ m. 
m
b
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Those three conditions imply that   mbzba 120   . Then, substituting p by its value in the 
objective function, we get a new formulation of the problem with a single variable (λ): 
(P1”): 








 11
1
2
2
0
 )( f Maximize
1
2 bb
bmzba
mb
zb
a 




 (29) 
Now, we can solve analytically the (M/M/1/1) model without penalty and holding costs. 
 
Proposition 1. Problem (P1’’) is relevant ( 0, p  and f (λ*) ≥ 0) if and only if   mbzba  12    
 
We assume that the condition of proposition 1 holds. We use the first derivative conditions in order to 
identify the stationary points of function f (λ).   
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The discriminant of this quadratic equation is  
12
2 4444 bmzba    with lz   
 124 mblba    
The 12 mblba  is equivalent to  with mp   and   is non-negative. Hence, it is proven that
0 . Hence, the quadratic equation (30) has two real roots, which are: 
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1 bmzba    and 12
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Given that λ1 is negative, there is only one feasible stationary point λ2. Suppose 02  : 
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This result corresponds to proposition 1. Hence, under proposition 1, λ2 is positive. When λ2 → 0, then 
objective function become 0. And when λ2 → ∞, then the objective function becomes -∞. Hence, λ2 is 
the optimal solution as given in proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2.  
The optimal solution of the (M/M/1/1) model without penalty and holding costs is: 
1. (optimal demand)  12
2* bmzba   with   sz  11ln ,  
2. (optimal lead-time)    sl  11ln* ,  
3.  (optimal price)   1**2* blbap  , and  
4.  (optimal profit) =     mp  ***  . 
 
5. Comparison between M/M/1/1 and M/M/1 without Penalty and Holding Costs 
In this section, we compare our model M/M/1/1 with the M/M/1 model developed in Pekgün et al. 
(2008). Recall that Pekgün et al. (2008) consider the same demand function used in this paper and do 
not include holding and penalty costs. We use a base case with parameters: lead-time sensitivity (b2) = 
6, price sensitivity (b1) = 4; Production capacity (μ) = 10; service level (s) = 0.95; unit direct variable 
cost (m) = 5. We consider different scenario by varying the market potential (a) and one of the above 
parameters. For each pair of value, for example (a, b2), we determine the optimal profits obtained 
from the M/M/1 and M/M/1/1, and deduce the relative gain resulting from using the M/M/1/1 setting 
This gain is calculated as follows %100
Profit
ProfitProfit
M/M/1
M/M/1M/M/1/1


 (33) 
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Clearly, a positive gain means that our M/M/1/1 is better while a negative gain indicates that the 
M/M/1 performs better. 
First, we study the impacts of market potential (a) and lead-time sensitivity (b2). As one can 
observe in table 1, the M/M/M/1 can be better than M/M/1. When the lead-time sensitivity is high, the 
rejection policy is always better. The rejection policy became better than all acceptance policy when 
the market potential is smaller. 
 
Table 1 - Comparison based on a and b2 
b2 M/M/1 vs M/M/1/1 
20 - 40.87% 17.94% 8.29% 3.42% 0.66% 
19 - 37.10% 15.27% 6.12% 1.57% -0.99% 
18 - 33.39% 12.61% 3.96% -0.30% -2.65% 
17 - 29.73% 9.96% 1.79% -2.18% -4.33% 
16 - 26.13% 7.31% -0.40% -4.07% -6.03% 
15 - 22.57% 4.66% -2.59% -5.99% -7.74% 
14 - 19.05% 2.01% -4.80% -7.92% -9.48% 
13 - 15.57% -0.65% -7.03% -9.87% -11.24% 
12 - 12.11% -3.32% -9.29% -11.86% -13.04% 
11 - 8.68% -6.02% -11.57% -13.88% -14.87% 
10 - 5.26% -8.74% -13.90% -15.94% -16.74% 
9 - 1.85% -11.49% -16.28% -18.06% -18.67% 
8 - -1.56% -14.30% -18.71% -20.23% -20.65% 
7 - -4.98% -17.17% -21.22% -22.48% -22.71% 
6 - -8.43% -20.13% -23.83% -24.83% -24.86% 
5 - -11.92% -23.20% -26.56% -27.30% -27.14% 
 
20 30 40 50 60 70 
a 
Note: 
      - Problem is infeasible for both M/M/1 and M/M/1/1 
   
Second, we vary the market potential (a) and price sensitivity (b1). We can deduce that when the 
costumer is highly sensitive to price, the M/M/M/1 performs better than the M/M/1 (see table 2). 
 
Table 2 - Comparison based on a and b1 
b1 M/M/1 vs M/M/1/1 
14 - - - - - - 
13 - - - - - 4.54% 
12 - - - - - -8.43% 
11 - - - - 4.54% -15.87% 
10 - - - - -8.43% -20.13% 
9 - - - 4.54% -15.87% -22.51% 
8 - - - -8.43% -20.13% -23.83% 
7 - - 4.54% -15.87% -22.51% -24.51% 
6 - - -8.43% -20.13% -23.83% -24.83% 
5 - 4.54% -15.87% -22.51% -24.51% -24.91% 
4 - -8.43% -20.13% -23.83% -24.83% -24.86% 
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b1 M/M/1 vs M/M/1/1 
3 4.54% -15.87% -22.51% -24.51% -24.91% -24.72% 
2 -8.43% -20.13% -23.83% -24.83% -24.86% -24.53% 
1 -15.87% -22.51% -24.51% -24.91% -24.72% -24.30% 
 
20 30 40 50 60 70 
 a 
 
Third, we vary the market potential (a) and service level (s) (see Table 3). To satisfy the service 
level, the firm can quote any lead-time under the M/M/1 setting as there is no penalty associated with 
overdue clients. However, if the service level is very high (close to 1), it requires quoting a very long 
lead-time. This leads to a great decrease in demand and, consequently, in profit. In this case, the 
M/M/1/1 can be better. 
 
Table 3 - Comparison based on a and s 
s M/M/1 vs M/M/1/1 
0.999 - 18,48% 1,57% -5,17% -8,24% -9,77% 
0.995 - 7,35% -7,07% -12,47% -14,68% -15,59% 
0.99 - 2.61% -10.87% -15.74% -17.58% -18.23% 
0.98 - -2.12% -14.77% -19.12% -20.59% -20.98% 
0.97 - -4.90% -17.10% -21.16% -22.43% -22.66% 
0.96 - -6.89% -18.79% -22.65% -23.76% -23.89% 
0.95 - -8.43% -20.13% -23.83% -24.83% -24.86% 
0.94 - -9.70% -21.23% -24.81% -25.71% -25.68% 
 
20 30 40 50 60 70 
 
a 
 
Finally, we vary the market potential (a) and production capacity (μ) (see Table 4). A small 
production capacity impacts on the service time as the firm will require longer lead-time to serve the 
clients. Hence, the policy to reject some of the clients is better in this situation. 
 
Table 4 - Comparison based on a and μ 
µ M/M/1 vs M/M/1/1 
10 - -8.43% -20.13% -23.83% -24.83% -24.86% 
9 - -5.72% -17.35% -20.83% -21.77% -21.82% 
8 - -1.70% -13.51% -16.94% -17.94% -18.09% 
7 - 4.32% -8.15% -11.82% -13.05% -13.42% 
6 - 13.62% -0.53% -4.90% -6.63% -7.40% 
5 - 28.77% 10.79% 4.86% 2.15% 0.67% 
4 - 56.01% 28.86% 19.59% 14.97% 12.21% 
3 - 116.15% 61.96% 44.62% 35.87% 30.51% 
2 - 359.61% 144.13% 98.95% 78.23% 66.03% 
1 - - 962.02% 359.37% 240.29% 186.72% 
 
20 30 40 50 60 70 
a 
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It is shown that the use of the client rejection policy can be better in some cases even when the 
penalty and holding cost are removed. Therefore, we expect that when penalty and holding cost are 
added, the rejection policy will even perform better. We investigate this problem in the next section 
 
6. M/M/1/1 with Penalty Cost and Holding Cost 
With the addition of penalty and holding costs, the objective function will be composed by three 
parts: expected revenue, total congestion costs, and total lateness penalty costs. The formulation of 
this objective function has been presented earlier. The service level constraint in this case is similar to 
the previous case: se l  1  as the Probability   lelWP  . Thus the formulation of this 
problem is: 
(P2) 
 ,,, lp
Maximize    le
cF
mp 




 

  (34) 
 Subject to  1 2a b p b l     (35) 
 1
le s   (36) 
 


   (37) 
 




1
1P  (38) 
  11 P    (39) 
 , , , 0l p    (40) 
Integrating the equality constraints (eq. (36 – 39)) into the objective function and rewriting
1 le s   as   sl  11ln , we get as the following formulation of the problem: 
(P2’) 
, ,
Maximize 
l p
 
 

 

  lceFmp
 (41) 
 Subject to  lbpba 21   (42) 
   sl  11ln  (43) 
 0,, lp  (44) 
Suppose that the optimal solution is given by price, p*, quoted lead-time l*, and demand rate λ*, and 
that λ* < Λ(p*,1*.). Since the revenues are increasing in p, one could increase the price to p' (while 
holding the demand rate and quoted lead-time constant) until λ* = Λ(p',1'). This change will increase 
revenues without increasing the costs. Therefore, (p*, l*, and λ*) cannot be an optimal solution. Thus, 
the demand constraint (eq. (42)) is binding at optimality. However, we also have conditions where: 
demand is positive (λ ≥ 0) and price is positive (p ≥ 0): 
0
1
2 

b
zba




zb
a 2  
Then, we substitute price p by its value and obtain the following formulation: 
(P2”)
0;0 2  l
zb
a
Maximize


 
   

 

  lceFmblba 12  (45) 
 Subject to    sl  11ln  (46) 
 0, l  (47) 
Unlike the first case where the penalty and holding costs are not considered, the service level 
constraint is not necessarily binding in this case, which complicates the solving approach. Indeed, for 
large values of unit penalty cost c, the real service level has to be very high (close to 1) to avoid a high 
penalty cost. This indicates that the real service level can be greater than the imposed service level (s). 
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The detailed proof is given in appendix I. We now present the main steps to get the optimal solution 
given in proposition 4. 
To solve the problem, we apply the Lagrangian multiplier method. The stationary points of 
problem (P2”) must satisfy: 
0



L
, 0


l
L
, 0




L
, 0  and 







s
l
1
1
ln  
where, 
 
   


















s
l
ceFmblba
lL
l
1
1
ln,, 12 




 (48) 
0


l
L
   
  le
ccb
b 

 

 11
1
2  
 Substitute cs
cb
b

1
21 , we have: 
   
  l
c e
c
s 

 

 1  (49) 
0




L
 0
1
1
ln 














s
l  (50) 
From   0  L , we know that there are two situations ( 0  or    011ln  sl ). 
Suppose that 0 , it implies that    011ln  sl  which also imply that the service level 
constraint is non-binding. Since 0 , equation (49) implies that lc es
1 . In addition, if the 
service level is non-binding, then se l  1 . It implies that ssc  . 
Next, suppose 0 , thus it implies    011ln  sl  which also means that the service level 
constraint is binding. Hence se l  1 . Combining with the eq. (49), it implies that: 
 
s
c
sc 




. This imply that ssc  . 
In the non-binding situation, the service level will be 
l
c es
1  with ssc  . And in the binding 
situation, the service level will be se l  1  with ssc  . Hence combining the both case, the 
service level will be:  c
l ssMaxe ,1   . 
As we have already explained, we have two situations: 
(1) the service level constraint (46) is non-binding: css  ,  
(2) the service level constraint (46) is binding: css  , 
where the critical value for the service level (sc) equals to 121 cbb . With this critical service level 
(sc), the lead-time can be found based on the two mutually exclusive cases of the service level: 
 ssMaxe c
l ,1      
 








ssMax
l
c ,1
1
ln
1*

 
   xl ln
1*

  where,   21,11 bcbsMaxx   (51) 
Before we move to find the optimal demand, we will discuss about the condition to have positive 
profit. To have the non-negative objective function, we have conditions: 
1. p ≥ m: 
 
m
b
lba


1
2
, with xl ln
1*

  and   21,11 bcbsMaxx  . (52) 
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2.   0

  le
cF
mp 




    
 
0

 

 lceFmp
 
It is obvious that 0  . Hence, the numerator should be: 
  0  lceFmp 
 
 lceFmp   

 


1
2
b
lba
 lceFm   
 01112 
 lecbFbmblba   (53) 
Equation (53) should be bigger than equal to zero to have a non-negative objective function. We 
determine the conditions to have positive profit in proposition 3. 
 
Proposition 3. The problem P2” is relevant (the optimal profit is positive) if and only if m
b
lba


1
2  
and 01112 
 lecbFbmblba  . 
 
We now show how to find the optimal demand. Indeed, 
0



L

 
 
0
2
2
1
2
1112 

 

 
b
cebFbmblba l
 (54) 
Numerator of eq. (54) should be equal to zero. 
  02 21112    lcebFbmblba  (55) 
The discriminant (Δ) of eq. (55) should be greater than 0 to have real roots. 
  
lcebFbmblba   1112
2 444444  (56) 
     0142 1112
2
  lcebFbmblba   
01112
2   lcebFbmblba   (57) 
The 
lcebFbmblba   1112  corresponds to proposition 3. This imply that to have a non-
negative objective functions, we have to have 12 mblba   1Fb 01 
 lceb  . With the 
0 , we can say that lba 2
2   0111 
 lcebFbmb   and 0 are proven. Because 
it is proven that the discriminant (Δ) is bigger than zero thus eq. (55) has two roots which are: 
1  lcebFbmblba   1112
2
  and  
2  
lcebFbmblba   1112
2
 (58) 
λ1 is negative. Then, there is only one stationary point λ2. Suppose 02  : 
01112
2   lcebFbmblba   
01112 
 lcebFbmblba   (59) 
This final equation corresponds to the proposition 3. Under the conditions of proposition 3, λ2 has a 
value greater than zero.  
When λ2 → 0 and l → 0, then objective function become 0. When λ2 → ∞ and l → 0, then the 
objective function becomes -∞. When λ2 → 0 and l → ∞, then the objective function becomes 0. And 
when λ2 → ∞ and l → ∞, then the objective function becomes -∞. Thus, the lead-time (l
*) and demand 
(λ2) provide the optimal solution. As a summary, the optimum point of this problem can be found 
based on the proposition 4. 
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Proposition 4. For problem P2: 
1. The optimal lead-time xl ln*   with   21,11 bcbsMaxx  . 
2. The optimal demand can be found by using equation
*
111
*
2
2* lcebFbmblba   ,  
3. the optimal price is   1**2* blbap  . 
4. The optimal profit    *** *     lceFmp . 
 
Based on the result found in this section, we will compare the results of the rejection policy with 
penalty and holding cost (modeled by M/M/1/1) to the results obtained with M/M/1 under the same 
setting. 
 
7. Comparison between M/M/1/1 and M/M/1 With Penalty and Holding Costs 
In this section, we compare our model (M/M/1/1) with the existing M/M/1 taken from Palaka et 
al. (1998). We vary the market potential (a) and other parameters. For each pair of value, for example 
(a, b2), we calculate the relative gain obtained by using M/M/1/1 instead of M/M/1. This relative is 
calculated as (33) We use the same parameters setting as in the previous comparison (lead-time 
sensitivity (b2) = 6, price sensitivity (b1) = 4; Production capacity (μ) = 10; service level (s) = 0.95; 
unit direct variable cost (m) = 5) with additions of F = 2 and c = 10. 
First, we compare the result based on the variation of market potential (a) and lead-time 
sensitivity (b2). As expected, there are more cases where M/M/1/1 is better than M/M/1 (see Table 5) 
compared to first case without penalty and holding. In the M/M/1 the holding cost can be very high 
because all clients are accepted. As observed in table 5, the M/M/1/1 is better when dealing with 
customers that are very sensitive to lead-time with low the market potential. 
 
Table 5 - Comparison based on a and b2 
b2 M/M/1 vs M/M/1/1 
20 - 53.96% 26.95% 15.50% 9.58% 6.11% 
19 - 49.95% 24.23% 13.33% 7.74% 4.49% 
18 - 46.02% 21.53% 11.17% 5.90% 2.86% 
17 - 42.16% 18.84% 9.02% 4.05% 1.22% 
16 - 38.37% 16.17% 6.86% 2.19% -0.43% 
15 - 34.64% 13.51% 4.69% 0.33% -2.09% 
14 - 30.96% 10.85% 2.52% -1.54% -3.76% 
13 - 27.34% 8.20% 0.34% -3.43% -5.45% 
12 - 23.77% 5.56% -1.85% -5.34% -7.16% 
11 - 20.24% 2.91% -4.05% -7.26% -8.89% 
10 - 16.74% 0.25% -6.27% -9.21% -10.65% 
9 - 13.28% -2.42% -8.52% -11.19% -12.43% 
8 - 9.84% -5.10% -10.80% -13.19% -14.25% 
7 - 6.42% -7.81% -13.11% -15.24% -16.10% 
6 - 3.01% -10.56% -15.47% -17.33% -18.01% 
5 - -0.40% -13.35% -17.88% -19.49% -19.97% 
 
20 30 40 50 60 70 
 a 
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Second, we vary the market potential (a) and price sensitivity (b1) (see Table 6). In M/M/1, the 
lead-time can become very long because we accept all clients. With the addition of the penalty cost 
for overdue clients, the profit will be worse with high value of price sensitivity of clients. Hence, for a 
firm facing a demand that is very sensitive to price, the M/M/1/1 could be better policy. 
 
Table 6 - Comparison based on a and b1 
b1 M/M/1 vs M/M/1/1 
13 - - - - - - 
12 - - - - - 26.18% 
11 - - - - 42.97% 11.99% 
10 - - - - 20.26% 2.93% 
9 - - - 35.50% 7.00% -3.27% 
8 - - - 14.45% -1.51% -7.76% 
7 - - 28.29% 2.01% -7.34% -11.16% 
6 - - 8.70% -6.00% -11.56% -13.87% 
5 - 21.30% -2.99% -11.49% -14.77% -16.10% 
4 - 3.01% -10.56% -15.47% -17.33% -18.01% 
3 14.50% -8.05% -15.75% -18.51% -19.47% -19.70% 
2 -2.69% -15.24% -19.53% -20.96% -21.32% -21.23% 
1 -13.22% -20.20% -22.45% -23.04% -22.98% -22.67% 
 
20 30 40 50 60 70 
a 
 
Third, we compare based on the variation of market potential (a) and service level (s) (see Table 7). If 
the firms set the service level close to 1, it will cause very long lead-time in M/M/1 model. The long 
lead-time will cause high holding cost which affect the demand and ruin the profit. Thus, rejecting 
some clients could be an alternative to keep the high profit. The M/M/1/1could be better in such 
situations. 
 
Table 7 - Comparison based on a and s 
s M/M/1 vs M/M/1/1 
0.999 - 27,99% 8,68% 0,74% -3,09% -5,15% 
0.995 - 16,78% 0,28% -6,25% -9,19% -10,63% 
0.99 - 12.21% -3.25% -9.22% -11.81% -12.99% 
0.98 - 7.90% -6.63% -12.10% -14.35% -15.29% 
0.97 - 5.58% -8.48% -13.68% -15.75% -16.56% 
0.96 - 4.07% -9.69% -14.72% -16.67% -17.41% 
0.95 - 3.01% -10.56% -15.47% -17.33% -18.01% 
0.94 - 2.22% -11.20% -16.02% -17.83% -18.46% 
 
20 30 40 50 60 70 
a 
 
Fourth, we compare based on the variation of market potential (a) and production rate (µ) (see 
Table 8). The production capacity affects the service time offered by the firms. If the production 
capacity is small; the service time for each client will be very long (service time = 1/μ). This long 
service will increase the waiting time, hene implying a higher holding cost. Thus, for firms with small 
production capacity, it can be better to reject some costumers. 
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Table 8 - Comparison based on a and μ 
μ M/M/1 vs M/M/1/1 
12 - -3,15% -16,06% -21,16% -23,10% -23,74% 
11 - -0,55% -13,70% -18,65% -20,51% -21,14% 
10 - 3,01% -10,56% -15,47% -17,33% -18,01% 
9 - 7,95% -6,36% -11,41% -13,40% -14,21% 
8 - 14,97% -0,67% -6,15% -8,45% -9,51% 
7 - 25,30% 7,18% 0,79% -2,08% -3,57% 
6 - 41,28% 18,43% 10,30% 6,40% 4,19% 
5 - 68,27% 35,52% 24,01% 18,26% 14,82% 
4 - 121,78% 64,17% 45,51% 36,16% 30,47% 
3 - 277,90% 122,19% 84,63% 66,97% 56,50% 
2 - - 312,26% 183,40% 136,67% 111,73% 
1 - - - 1496,14% 550,83% 363,51% 
 
20 30 40 50 60 70 
a 
 
Fifth, we vary the market potential (a) and holding cost (F) (see Table 9). The holding cost affects 
the total profit. In M/M/1, there is a possibility that a client has a very long lead-time. This long 
holding period will lead to an expensive holding cost. Thus, it decreases the profit. This condition 
explains that reject some clients could be a better policy. 
 
Table 9 - Comparison based on a and F 
F M/M/1 vs M/M/1/1 
11 - 46,09% 21,57% 11,21% 5,93% 2,89% 
10 - 40,94% 17,99% 8,33% 3,46% 0,70% 
9 - 35,92% 14,43% 5,44% 0,98% -1,51% 
8 - 31,00% 10,88% 2,55% -1,52% -3,74% 
7 - 26,18% 7,35% -0,36% -4,05% -6,00% 
6 - 21,44% 3,81% -3,30% -6,60% -8,30% 
5 - 16,76% 0,27% -6,26% -9,20% -10,63% 
4 - 12,14% -3,30% -9,27% -11,84% -13,02% 
3 - 7,56% -6,90% -12,33% -14,55% -15,48% 
2 - 3,01% -10,56% -15,47% -17,33% -18,01% 
1 - -1,55% -14,29% -18,70% -20,22% -20,64% 
0 - -6,13% -18,14% -22,07% -23,25% -23,41% 
 
20 30 40 50 60 70 
a 
 
Sixth, we vary the market potential (a) and penalty cost (c) (see Table 10). Because we set the 
service level to (95%), it means that there are only 5% of overdue clients. In high market potential and 
all client’s acceptance policy, penalty cost is negligible with comparison to revenue. However, it can 
be seen that there is a decrease in the superiority of M/M/1 to M/M/1/1 in function of the penalty cost. 
It can be concluded that in big market potential, if we continue to increase the penalty cost, there will 
be a situation where the M/M/1/1 is superior. In small market potential, the 5% of overdue clients is 
significant. The penalty cost is affecting the profit. Hence, reject some client is better as there isn’t 
any penalty in rejecting clients. 
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Table 10 - Comparison based on a and c 
c M/M/1 vs M/M/1/1 
10 - 3,01% -10,56% -15,47% -17,33% -18,01% 
9 - 2,78% -10,74% -15,63% -17,48% -18,14% 
8 - 2,55% -10,93% -15,79% -17,62% -18,27% 
7 - 2,32% -11,11% -15,95% -17,76% -18,40% 
6 - 2,09% -11,30% -16,11% -17,90% -18,53% 
5 - 1,87% -11,48% -16,27% -18,05% -18,66% 
4 - 1,64% -11,67% -16,43% -18,19% -18,79% 
3 - 1,41% -11,85% -16,59% -18,33% -18,92% 
2 - 1,18% -12,04% -16,75% -18,48% -19,05% 
1 - 0,96% -12,23% -16,91% -18,62% -19,18% 
0 - 0,73% -12,41% -17,07% -18,76% -19,31% 
 
20 30 40 50 60 70 
a 
 
8. Conclusion 
In this paper, we provide the general model of M/M/1/K for case with and without holding and 
penalty cost. We solve both case analytically for K=1. We compare our M/M/1/1 model with the 
existing M/M/1 model taken from Pekgün et al. (2008) and Palaka et al. (1998). In the case where the 
penalty and holding cost aren’t considered, the M/M/1/K is better when the customers are lead-time 
sensitive, the market potential is small, and the firm’s production capacity (mean service rate) is 
small. In the case where the penalty and holding cost are considered, the M/M/1/K is better when the 
customers are lead-time sensitive, the market potential is small, the firm’s production capacity (mean 
service rate) is small and the holding cost is high. We currently working in an extension of this 
research which is K > 1. Another possible extension is modeling the system in M/D/1. 
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